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An important function of the modern judiciary is to ensure that deci-
sions by administrative agencies remain within statutory boundaries.
These boundaries, however, are often imprecise. Rather than specify the
precise details of a program, Congress often gives an agency a broad man-
date, for example, to clean up the environment, to monitor the banking
system, or to improve worker safety. In such circumstances, federal courts
sometimes defer to statutory interpretations made by the implementing
agencies.
Affording deference to an agency's legal analysis, however, seems
facially contrary to the fundamental principle, incorporated in Chief
Justice John Marshall's broad dictum in Marbury v. Madison,' that "[it
is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." 2 Judicial deference to agencies' statutory interpretations thus consti-
tutes a continuing source of tension for judges because it necessarily means
that an agency of the executive branch, to a greater or lesser degree, is
displacing the judiciary in its traditional and jealously guarded law-
declaring function.' Largely because of this tension between the judiciary's
law-declaring function and the need to defer to congressional delegation,
application of the deference doctrine in the federal courts has been rather
erratic."
The Supreme Court recently dealt with this recurring problem in a
series of cases, beginning with its watershed decision in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,6 which involved an
interpretation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977' rendered by the
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. I would like to
thank my law clerk, Gene Schaerr, for his invaluable assistance in preparing this article.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that Supreme Court lacked the power to order the
Secretary of State to deliver judicial commissions) (Marshall, C.J.).
2. Id. at 177.
3. See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
4. E.g., Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.),
affid sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); Coffman, Judicial
Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983); Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Questions of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 350-51 (1955); Monaghan, supra note 3,
at 3-4, 31; Stever, Deference to Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental, Health and
Safety Litigation-Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
35, 62 (1983).
5. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
6. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 746-51 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1982)).
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Chevron decision was both
evolutionary and revolutionary. It was evolutionary because it applied and
refined a long line of Supreme Court precedent reminding lower federal
courts of their obligation to defer to an agency's reasonable construction of
any statutes administered by that agency." It was also revolutionary be-
cause it eliminated a significant ambiguity in the law and cast substantial
doubt upon several well-established doctrines that had sometimes permit-
ted courts to overturn agency interpretations. This revolutionary effect is
not apparent from a quick examination of the opinion itself. The opinion
on its face signals no break with the past; it does not explicitly overrule or
disapprove of a single case. Nonetheless, Chevron has quickly become a
decision of great importance, one of a small number of cases that every
judge bears in mind when reviewing agency decisions.
Chevron is significant for two reasons. First, just as a lesser known case
of the 1970's, Batterton v. Francis,8 narrowed the scope of judicial review
of welfare legislation,9 Chevron narrowed the ambit of judicial review of
complex regulatory issues. In short, Chevron has made it more difficult
for courts to overturn policy choices made by agencies when these choices
are embodied in legal interpretations of statutes administered by the agen-
cies. Second, the Court's decision rendered untenable an assumption that
seems to have undergirded many administrative law decisions in the past:
that federal courts have a general duty to supervise agencies in much the
same way that the Supreme Court supervises lower federal courts.
This article will elaborate upon Chevron's implications for judicial
review. Part I briefly describes the case and its history and discusses more
recent Supreme Court cases that have applied Chevron's analytical frame-
work. Part II sets forth my view of the decision's legal consequences-its
effects on the deference doctrine and related principles. Part III explores
the fundamental shift Chevron has signaled in the relationship between
federal courts and administrative agencies. Part IV sets forth my reasons
for believing that the case was correctly decided.
7. See, e.g., Bayside Enterprises v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304 (1977); Federal Maritime Commis-
sion v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 385-86
(1962); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
8. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
9. In Batterton, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare had defined "unemployment" in
such a way as to exclude from participation in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-
Unemployed Fathers program all families whose fathers' unemployment resulted from misconduct,
involvement in a strike, or voluntarily quitting their jobs. The Supreme Court upheld the Secretary's
regulation as reasonable. The Court said that where, as in that case, "Congress entrusts to the Secre-
tary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term,... [a]
reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the
statute in a different manner." 432 U.S. at 425.
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I. A New Approach to Review of Agency Interpretations
Chevron introduced a two-part test for reviewing agencies' statutory in-
terpretations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, after find-
ing no clear legislative intent on the definitional question at issue, had
relied on an analysis of the general policy underlying the statute to invali-
date the EPA interpretation. The Supreme Court reversed and found that,
absent direct evidence of legislative intent, the Agency's interpretation
should be allowed if it is a reasonable reading of the statute. Subsequent
Supreme Court cases have reiterated this new approach.
A. Chevron in the D.C. Circuit
The dispute in Chevron involved EPA's definition of "stationary
source," a key term in both the 1970 and 1977 amendments to the Clean
Air Act.10 The 1970 amendments were passed largely in reaction to the
perceived failure of the states to cooperate fully with the federal govern-
ment in protecting and improving air quality.1 The law required states to
develop pollution control programs, called State Implementation Plans
(SIPs), to prevent levels of certain atmospheric pollutants from exceeding
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) set by EPA.
12
The legislation also established deadlines for attainment of the
NAAQSs.'
By 1976, however, many states had failed to achieve the NAAQSs
within the statutory deadlines. Congress responded to the problem of these
"non-attainment areas" by adding Part D to Title I of the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments,1 which required states with non-attainment areas
to submit revised SIPs by January 1, 1979.15 Part D required that these
10. The term "stationary source" was used in the new source performance standard provisions of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and defined for the purpose of those provisions. Pub. L. No.
91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(3) (1982)). The term "major station-
ary source" was included in the non-attainment area provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 746-48 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1982)). The
1977 amendments defined the term "major stationary source" for purposes of the Act, but the defini-
tion addresses the meaning of "major" without clarifying the meaning of "stationary source." Pub. L.
No. 95-95, § 301, 91 Stat. 685, 770 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 76020) (1982)).
11. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
12. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409,
7410 (1982)).
13. See Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-82. The 1970 Act required that state imple-
mentation plans incorporate the goal of achieving the NAAQSs as expeditiously as practicable but in
no case later than three years after the date of approval of such plan. The law also provided for a
two-year extension of these deadlines under certain circumstances. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1982).
15. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(c), 91 Stat. 685, 750-51. This deadline was later extended to July
1, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(b)(2), 91 Stat. 1393, 1404.
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revised SIPs contain permit programs "for the construction and operation
of new or modified major stationary sources" of pollution in non-
attainment areas. 6 Part D also carried a big stick: it prohibited major
new construction in any non-attainment area for which there was no SIP
meeting all of the statutory requirements.
17
EPA's view of what constituted a "stationary source" was therefore of
critical importance. Since the passage of the 1970 amendments, EPA had
developed two distinct definitions of the term "source" in other contexts.
Under the "dual" definition, an individual piece of equipment was consid-
ered a source." Under the "plant-wide" or "bubble" definition, an entire
plant, including all of the various individual pieces of equipment, was
considered a source." The bubble definition was more lenient; it
exempted replacements of individual pieces of equipment from EPA's
requirements so long as the total emissions level of the plant was not
increased above a certain limit.
20
In the waning months of the Carter Administration, EPA conducted an
informal rulemaking pursuant to which it concluded that the more strin-
gent dual definition should be adopted for non-attainment areas because
"Congress intended that new source review be applied to the greatest
extent possible" in reducing pollution levels.2 ' In early 1981, however, the
incoming Administration called on agencies to conduct a "Government-
wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and complexities. ' '2' As a result
of this review, EPA conducted another informal rulemaking, at the con-
clusion of which it repealed the more stringent 1980 rules and replaced
the dual definition with the more lenient bubble standard. 3 This change
allowed states in non-attainment areas to employ the bubble approach in
their SIPs.
2 4
In response to EPA's shift in position, the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) and several other groups petitioned the Court of
Appeals for review of EPA's new regulation.2" In an opinion striking
16. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 747 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)). The
requirements for the permit program are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I) (1982).
18. See Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 248-49 (1984) and citations
therein.
19. Id.
20. See id.; Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation:
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 DUKE L. J. 469, 474-75 and
citations therein.
21. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,697 (1980) (final rule adopting the dual definition).
22. 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280, 16,281 (1981) (proposal to amend rules to incorporate bubble
definition).
23. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981) (final rule adopting the bubble definition).
24. See, e.g., DeLong, The Bubble Case, AD. L. NEWS, Fall 1984, at 1.
25. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
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down the new bubble approach, the court observed that the relevant por-
tion of the amended Clean Air Act "does not explicitly define what Con-
gress envisioned as a 'stationary source' " for purposes of Part D's permit
process and construction moratorium."6 Next, the court found that the leg-
islative history was "at best contradictory" on the definitional question."
Given Congress' lack of clarity as to the meaning of "stationary source,"
the court felt free to provide its own interpretation of the statute. It found
that "the purposes of the non-attainment program should guide our deci-
sion here."'28 Relying on two earlier decisions,2 9 the court held that the
bubble concept was mandatory for Clean Air Act programs designed
merely to maintain existing air quality, but was inappropriate when ap-
plied to programs designed to improve air quality."0 In other words, the
court found that EPA's employment of the bubble definition was inconsis-
tent with the statute's purpose of ameliorating, rather than merely main-
taining, air quality. The regulation was thus set aside as incompatible
with Congress' remedial purposes."
B. The Supreme Court's Two-Step Framework
Chevron successfully sought review in the Supreme Court. In a unani-
mous opinion overturning the Court of Appeals' decision, Justice Stevens
laid out a general framework for analyzing agency interpretations of stat-
utes. He began by gently chastising the lower court for "misconceiv[ing]
the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue.""8 According to
the Court, the Court of Appeals erred when it rendered its own de novo
interpretation of the statute after determining "that Congress did not actu-
ally have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the
permit program."3  Having made that determination, the lower court
should not have addressed whether the bubble concept was inappropriate
or inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute. Instead, the
inquiry should have been "whether the Administrator's view that it is
appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable
one."
8 4
rev'd sub nom. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
26. Id. at 723.
27. Id. at 726 n.3 9.
28. Id.
29. ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636
F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
30. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 726.
31. Id. at 726-27.
32. 104 S. Ct. at 2781, 2783 (1984).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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In the course of this decision, the Supreme Court articulated a simple,
two-step framework for analyzing cases in which an agency charged with
administering a particular statute finds its interpretation of that statute
under attack. First, the court must consider whether Congress "has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue."" This inquiry into legis-
lative intent should focus first on the plain language of the statute. If the
answer is not found in the statute itself, then the court should look to the
measure's legislative history. As the Court declared, "if the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.""
In cases where Congress' intent is not clear, the Supreme Court man-
dated a second analytical step that differed from the approach taken by
the Court of Appeals. The Court stated: "[I]f the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.""7 Other parts of the opinion made it clear that the word "permis-
sible," as used here, simply meant "reasonable," 8 an admittedly ambigu-
ous-but nonetheless common-term of art in administrative law. A re-
viewing court is therefore obliged in these circumstances to uphold any
reasonable interpretation offered by the agency. 9 When an administrative
agency has already interpreted the statute, then, "the court does not sim-
ply impose its own construction." 4
C. Post-Chevron Jurisprudence
In the two years since Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court has
applied Chevron's analytic framework in several cases, most notably
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC,41 United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc.,42 and Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial
Corp."' The first two decisions, like Chevron, upheld agency
interpretations by finding that Congress had expressed no clear intent
and that the agency's interpretation was reasonable." In Dimension
35. Id. at 2781.
36. Id. at 2781-82 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 2782 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 2792.
39. Id. at 2782.
40. Id.
41. 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).
42. 54 U.S.L.W. 4027 (U.S. December 4, 1985) (No. 84-701).
43. 54 U.S.L.W. 4101 (U.S. January 22, 1986) (No. 84-1274).
44. Just before this article went to press, the Court decided yet another case that, like Chevron,
upheld an agency interpretation on this ground. United States v. City of Fulton, 54 U.S.L.W. 4343
(U.S. April 8, 1986) (No. 84-1725). Certain other cases, moreover, have applied the Chevron analyti-
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Financial, the Court applied the first step of the Chevron framework and
rejected an administrative interpretation on the ground that it was con-
trary to clear legislative intent as manifested in the statute itself.
Chemical Manufacturers involved EPA's interpretation of the term
"modify" in section 301(1) of the Clean Water Act.4 EPA had promul-
gated regulations establishing categories of pollution sources, based on
particular statutory factors, and setting effluent limitations for those cate-
gories. 46 Under the regulations, however, a company could obtain a vari-
ance from these limitations by demonstrating to EPA that its industrial
plant was "fundamentally different" in some relevant way from the other
types of plants in the category to which EPA had assigned it."' This
"Fundamentally Different Factor" variance program was challenged on
the ground that, under section 301(1) of the Act,"' EPA may not "modify"
any requirement of section 301 relating to certain toxic pollutants. EPA,
however, interpreted that provision as prohibiting only those modifications
expressly permitted by other provisions of section 301-namely those
based on economic and water quality considerations 9-not as a general
prohibition against modifying any effluent limitations.5"
Justice White, writing for a majority of the Court, began his analysis
by restating the analytic framework developed in Chevron.' After an
extensive analysis of the statute and its legislative history, he concluded
that Congress had not clearly expressed any view on the issue."2 As in
Chevron, the Court upheld EPA's interpretation as a reasonable interpre-
tation of an ambiguous statute." The four dissenting Justices, speaking
through Justice Marshall, maintained that Congress had intended to pre-
vent EPA from modifying any of its effluent standards;" since Congress'
intent was clear, EPA was bound to adhere to the considered judgment of
the Article I branch. At the same time, the dissenters went to some length
to point out that their disagreement with the majority did not reflect a
disagreement either with Chevron or with the majority's reading of that
case." Justice Marshall wrote, "[i]f I agreed with the Court's analysis of
cal framework without expressly invoking Chevron. See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
45. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(c), 91 Stat. 1566, 1590 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982)).
46. 105 S. Ct. at 1105.
47. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1983).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982).
49. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(c), 131 1(g) (1982).
50. 105 S. Ct. at 1107-08.
51. Id. at 1108.
52. Id. at 1110.
53. Id. at 1112.
54. Id. at 1114.
55. Id. at 1121.
Yale Journal on Regulation
the statute and the legislative history, I too would conclude that Chevron
commands deference to the administrative construction.
' 56
Justice White also authored the Riverside Bayview opinion, in which
the Court regained its Chevron unanimity. At issue was an interpretation
of the Clean Water Act by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Clean
Water Act establishes permit requirements for discharge of dredged or fill
materials into "navigable waters," defined merely as "waters of the
United States."'5 7 The Corps, however, issued regulations which defined
"waters of the United States" to include not only navigable waters but
also "fresh water wetlands" adjacent to, but not regularly flooded by,
other bodies of water included in the definition." The Corps' expansive
interpretation of this statutory term was opposed by a real estate devel-
oper anxious to construct a housing development on low-lying, marshy
land without seeking the Corps' permission."
Justice White's opinion followed the approach enunciated in Chevron
and applied by a divided Court in Chemical Manufacturers. He con-
cluded that Congress had left open the issue of whether such wetlands
could be considered "waters of the United States," and stated that the
reviewing court's analysis of the Corps' construction of the statute "is lim-
ited to the question whether it is reasonable, in light of the language,
policies, and legislative history of the Act." 60 The Court found that the
Corps' interpretation was reasonable."
The third opinion in the post-Chevron line, Dimension Financial, was
written for a unanimous Court by Chief Justice Burger. At issue was an
attempt by the Federal Reserve Board to assert jurisdiction over so-called
"non-bank banks." The Board had accomplished this jurisdictional out-
reach by amending and broadening the definition of "bank" contained in
its Regulation Y." Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
"bank" is defined as any institution that "(1) accepts deposits that the
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand and (2) engages in the
business of making commercial loans."6 In amending Regulation Y, the
Board interpreted the first clause of this definition to include deposits that
"as a matter of practice" are payable on demand, and interpreted the term
"commercial loans" in the second clause to include commercial loan sub-
56. Id.
57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362(7) (1982).
58. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1985).
59. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4028 (1985).
60. Id. at 4030.
61. Id. at 4032.
62. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1985).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
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stitutes, that is, transactions through which credit is extended to commer-
cial enterprises without the use of a conventional commercial loan.64
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision setting aside
the regulation. Relying on Chevron, the Chief Justice concluded that the
statute was "clear and unambiguous," and that the Board's interpretation
was contrary to congressional intent." The Court thus reached its decision
solely by engaging in step one of the Chevron analysis; the second step
was unnecessary.
These cases demonstrate that Chevron's two-step approach to analyzing
agency interpretations of statutes is firmly entrenched in the body of law
applicable to judicial review of agency action. Although it can be argued
whether Chevron was properly applied in these cases,"' Chevron's analyt-
ical framework appears to be here to stay.
II. Chevron's Legal Effects
As one would expect with a landmark case, expressions of uncertainty
promptly emerged as to Chevron's precise meaning."' The Supreme
Court's subsequent pronouncements, however, have clarified the effects of
the decision on the deference question. On the one hand, Chevron
strengthened the judicial deference principle; on the other hand, the case
raised yet unanswered questions about its application.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(1) (1985).
65. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4103.
66.: Bruce Fein, for example, has recently argued that the analysis in Dimension Financial is
inconsistent with Chevron. Fein, Agency Discretion Unwisely Limited in 'Dimension', LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1986, at 10.
67. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REV. 505, 549-53 (1985);
DeLong, supra note 24, at 5, 7; Note, supra note 20, at 469-96. The lower courts, however, have had
little difficulty applying the Chevron framework. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Marine
Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 1985) (absent compelling evidence of error, arbitrariness,
or indications that the interpretation is unsupported by statute, the Comptroller of the Currency's
interpretation of the term "branch" in a bank regulatory statute deserved deference, even if a court
would have rendered a different permissible interpretation); State of Texas v. United States, 756 F.2d
419, 421 (5th Cir. 1985) (ICC's interpretation of a statute regulating bus lines was permissible and
therefore entitled to deference, even if a different interpretation by the D.C. Circuit was perhaps more
in line with legislative intent); Missouri Public Service Comm'n v. ICC, 763 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th
Cir. 1985) (holding that the question for the Court is whether the agency's standard is based on a
reasonable interpretation of the statute, that the ICC's construction of statute regulating bus lines was
"reasonable and consistent with the plain language and legislative history" of the statute, and that the
ICC's interpretation therefore must be upheld); Sudemir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir.
1985) (Secretary of Health and Human Services' interpretation of statute supporting denial of AFDC
benefits to asylum applicants must be reviewed under a permissibility standard; a reasonable construc-
tion could not be struck down merely because the court would prefer another); Callaway v. Block, 763
F.2d 1283, 1288 (11 th Cir. 1985) (Secretary of Agriculture's interpretation of a statute was entitled to
deference absent compelling signs that it was wrong; the court need not conclude that the agency's
construction was the only permissible one, or that it would have reached the same interpretation, in
order to uphold it).
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A. The Deference Principle
At first blush, Chevron appears to be little more than an application of
long-standing Supreme Court precedent calling for courts to defer to
administrative interpretations absent strong reasons for not doing so. 8 A
generation ago, for example, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.," the
Court stated that "where the question is one of specific application of a
broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering
the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is
limited.""0 The agency's interpretation, the Court thought, should be
accepted as long as it has "warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in
law."71 Moreover, as the Court subsequently stated in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC,2 such an interpretation "should be followed unless
there are compelling indications that it is wrong."
'73
Chevron not only reaffirmed the deference principle but buttressed it in
several ways. First, it removed a long-standing ambiguity in the law
resulting from the existence of two distinct lines of cases, one calling for
deference, the other disregarding deference altogether. Second, it elimi-
nated much of the courts' authority to invalidate agency interpretations
based on perceived inconsistencies with congressional policies. Third, it
specified certain conditions under which courts are required to give con-
trolling weight to agency interpretations. Fourth, it seemingly rendered
the longevity of an agency's interpretation irrelevant in determining how
much weight the interpretation should be given.
Chevron's first effect on the deference principle was to eliminate a long-
standing ambiguity in the law. Prior to Chevron, it was difficult to discern
68. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 4, at 263 and cases cited therein; Monaghan, supra note 3, at 15
and n.83 and cases cited therein; Stever, supra note 4, at 36-41 and cases cited therein; Weaver,
Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PrTr. L. REV. 587
n.3 (1984) and cases cited therein; Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2782 nn.11,14 and cases cited therein. See
also Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 104 S. Ct. 2472, 2479 (1984)
("Under established administrative law principles, it is clear that the Administrator's interpretation of
the Regional Act is to be given great weight."); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982) ("We have
often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled
to substantial deference."); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 738 (1977) ("The interpretation of the
agency charged with administration of the statute is, of course, entitled to substantial deference.");
Investment Company Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971) ("[Ilt is settled that courts should
give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged
with the enforcement of that statute."); Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54
(1946) ("To sustain the Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find that its
construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the
question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.").
69. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
70. Id. at 131.
71. Id.
72. 395 U.S. 367 (1968).
73. Id. at 381.
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any single standard for judicial review of agency interpretations."' In con-
trast to the line of cases which called for judicial deference to agency in-
terpretations 75 was another, equally impressive, line of Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court freely substituted its own judgment for that
of the agency with no mention of deference.7 In Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Millhollin," for example, the Court deferred to a Federal Reserve
Board interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act, emphasizing that con-
siderable respect is due the interpretation of a statute given by an agency
charged with its administration.7 8 The following year, however, in United
States v. Swank,7 the Court rejected an Internal Revenue Service
construction of a section of the Internal Revenue Code without discussing
deference at all.80
Not only were there two conflicting lines of cases, but the Court failed
to formulate any consistent rationale explaining why it sometimes used
74. Perhaps the best explication of the ambiguity that existed in the law prior to Chevron was
offered by Judge Henry J. Friendly in 1976. Of the Supreme Court's deference decisions, he
remarked:
We think it is time to recognize ... that there are two lines of Supreme Court decisions on
this subject which are analytically in conflict, with the result that a court of appeals must
choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand. Leading cases support the view
that great deference must be given to the decisions of an administrative agency applying a
statute to the facts and that such decisions can be reversed only if without rational basis....
However, there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for
administrative judgment when the question involves the meaning of a statutory term. . . .In
one of its most recent decisions on the subject, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 .. .(1974),
the Court held that "In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be
consistent with the Congressional purpose;" this very nearly eliminates the "deference" princi-
ple as regards statutory construction altogether since if the agency's determination is found by
a court to be consistent with the Congressional purpose, it presumably would be affirmed on
that ground without any need for deference.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
This conflict had its genesis long ago in the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall. His statement in
Marbury that it was "the province of the judicial department to say what the law is" seemed to allow
little, if any, room for deference to statutory interpretation by the Executive. 5 U.S. at 177. Yet, six
years after Marbury, Marshall expressed a different view in United States v. Vowell & M'Lean, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 368 (1808). That case involved a lawsuit brought to enforce a bond given for custom
duties owed on a particular commodity. The case turned on when the bondholder's duty had accrued.
Id. at 368. In a one paragraph decision, Justice Marshall stated that "[i]f the question had been
doubtful, the court would have respected the uniform construction which it is understood has been
given by the treasury department of the United States upon similar questions." Id. at 372.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
76. See, e.g., Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); Blanding v. DuBoso, 454 U.S. 393
(1982); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 181 (1981); Anderson Bros.
Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205 (1981); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); Ehlert v.
United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Bowles v.
Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898).
77. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
78. Id. at 566.
79. 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
80. Justice White, in dissent, stated that "the Court's opinion ... is nothing more than a substi-
tution of what it deems meet and proper for the wholly reasonable views of the Internal Revenue
Service as to the meaning of its own regulation and of the statutory provisions." 451 U.S. at 595.
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one approach and sometimes the other."1 Not surprisingly, this led several
commentators to suggest that the deference standard was being applied in
a result-oriented manner,8 with judges making independent interpreta-
tions and then invoking the principle only when it was convenient. 83
Justice Marshall, dissenting from the Court's decision to reject an agency
interpretation of a statute in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute,84 argued that by ignoring precedent calling
for judicial deference, the Court had given credence to the "frequently
voiced criticism" that the deference principle is honored "only when the
Court finds itself in substantive agreement with the agency action at
issue."85 At the very least, the lingering ambiguity in the law constituted a
source of confusion for lower federal courts.86
Chevron removed this ambiguity by enunciating its two-step analytical
framework. By so doing, the Court implicitly disapproved the approach
embodied in earlier cases in which courts, without pointing to any clear
expression of congressional intent and without even pausing to consider
whether deference to the agency would be appropriate, simply decided
legal questions already passed upon by administrative agencies.
87
Chevron's clear-cut analytic approach effectively removed the most obvi-
ous avenue for courts seeking to avoid deference to a particular agency
interpretation.
Chevron also strengthened the deference principle by restricting the
power of federal courts to reject an agency interpretation on the grounds
of infidelity to the policies underlying the statute. Pre-Chevron cases, such
as Federal Elections Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee,88 held that an agency interpretation could be overturned either
because it violated Congress' clearly enunciated intent, or because it
"frustate[d] the policy that Congress sought to implement."89 Chevron, by
contrast, held that, once a court has determined that Congress had no
intent with regard to the question before it, policy considerations should
play little, if any, role. The decision recognized that, because a statute
81. See 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:07 (1978); Coffman, supra note 4, at
3 n.13.
82. See Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771,
780-81 (1975); Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 890 (1930).
83. Weaver, supra note 68, at 590.
84. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
85. Id. at 712.
86. See supra note 74.
87. See, e.g., Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944).
88. 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
89. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). This language has been quoted, but not relied upon, in post-
Chevron cases. See, e.g., Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 2979, 2983
(1984).
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often represents a compromise or accommodation between two or more
conflicting policies, discerning a single underlying policy or purpose can
be difficult.90 The Court emphatically stated that it was for the agency,
not the reviewing court, "to make such policy choices-resolving the com-
peting interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve,
or intentionally left to be resolved."" The Court of Appeals, it will be
recalled, had rejected EPA's interpretation on the ground that it was in-
consistent with the purposes of the Clean Air Act amendments.9 By in-
validating the Court of Appeals' approach, the Supreme Court invalidated
what had been a rather common method of overturning agency
interpretations.98
After Chevron, the one clear avenue for courts to appeal to congres-
sional policy in statutory interpretation cases arises under the first step of
the Chevron analysis. For example, a reviewing court may find a statute's
terms to be crystal clear but nonetheless irrational or patently contrary to
the legislative history, leaving the court to look to the underlying purposes
of the statute in order to resolve the conflict. This analytical mode is not,
however, an open invitation for the judiciary to force recalcitrant agencies
to implement more vigorously the policies that animated Congress in the
first instance. Instead, upon analysis, this approach seems to be merely an
exception to the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction, which
provides that statutory language is the starting point for divining legisla-
tive intent. Moreover, such cases are rare indeed, likely to exist only
where the statutory language admits of only one reading and where that
reading could not possibly have been embraced by a reasonable Congress
seeking to attain the goals it sought.
A recent case in our court, Max Ralis v. RFEIRL, Inc.," illustrates
the difficulty of arguing successfully that implicit congressional policy
90. 104 S. Ct. at 2793 & n.41. See also Stukane, EPA's Bubble Concept After Chevron v. NRDC:
Who is to Guard the Guards Themselves?, 17 NAT. RESOURcEs LAW. 647, 678-79 (1985) (tendency
of courts is to search for the purpose of specific provision of statute under consideration, yet problems
arise where the statute itself embodies multiple, overlapping goals).
91. 104 S. Ct. at 2793. The Court concluded:
[W]hen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within the gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do.
Id.
92. See 685 F.2d at 726.
93. See DeLong, supra note 24, at 7. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1978); FMC
v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390
U.S. 261, 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965); Federal Maritime Bd. v.
Isbrandsten Co., 356 U.S. 481, 499-500 (1957).
94. 770 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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should override the clear terms of the statute. In that case, the issue was
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) permitted
discrimination against otherwise protected employees who were situated
outside the United States. The ADEA, by virtue of its express incorpora-
tion of the limitations embodied in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
was limited to the territorial boundaries of the United States. The plain-
tiff, a U.S. citizen who had been working in Europe for Radio Free
Europe, claimed that his involuntary retirement was discriminatory and
argued that rigorous application of the literal language of the statute
would create an anomaly: all anti-discrimination statutes except the
ADEA would apply to U.S. citizens employed abroad by American firms.
This contention, however, was insufficient to persuade the court to over-
ride the plain meaning of the statute. 5 In the court's view, whatever
Congress may have had in mind by incorporating the FLSA's territorial
limitations into the ADEA, it was not for the judiciary to rewrite the
statute so as to accomplish the broader policy goals undergirding the
statute.
A third way in which Chevron strengthened the deference principle
was by modifying the meaning of "deference." In some earlier cases, to
defer to an agency interpretation had merely meant giving some weight to
that interpretation. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst, for example,
enunciated its own interpretation of the statutory term "employee" before
even discussing the NLRB's interpretation." This suggests that the Court
viewed the NLRB's consonant interpretation as a happy coincidence. To
defer to an agency's interpretation, then, was merely to give some weight
to its interpretation.
97
In Chevron, however, the Court made it clear that if its two conditions
for deferring to the agencies are met,98 "a court may not substitute its own
construction" for that of the agency."' In Chevron, then, deference meant
that a reviewing court not only must consider the agency's interpretation,
but must give controlling weight to that interpretation when these pre-
conditions are met.100
95. Id. at 1124.
96. See 322 U.S. 111, 128-32.
97. Indeed, Hearst also stated that "questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising
in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight" to
the agency's interpretation. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
98. As explained above, these conditions are the absence of an explicit congressional intent and a
reasonable interpretation by the agency. See text accompanying notes 35-40.
99. 104 S. Ct. at 2782.
100. See Saunders, Interpretative Rules-Legislative Effect 18, 19 (1986) (forthcoming in the
Duke Law Journal).
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Chevron's fourth effect on the deference principle was to cast doubt
upon a number of earlier decisions which had adopted a "sliding scale"
approach in determining how much deference to afford an agency's statu-
tory interpretation. 10 1 These decisions indicated that the degree of defer-
ence to which an interpretation would be entitled depended upon such
factors as whether the agency's interpretation had been consistent over a
long period, whether the agency had helped shepherd the legislation
through Congress, whether the agency's interpretation was adopted near
the time the statute was passed, and whether the agency possessed special
expertise.102 All are common-sense indicia of reliability.
Chevron, however, specifically found irrelevant the first of these
common-sense factors, and, as discussed in the next section, has cast doubt
upon the others. The Court pointedly rejected the argument that EPA's
interpretation was entitled to little or no deference because it was a recent
interpretation and because the Agency had, in the past, adopted conflicting
interpretations of the same provision. 0 8 Indeed, the Court seemed to find
merit in the Agency's change in position: "An initial agency interpretation
is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, to engage in informed
rulemaking, the agency must consider varying interpretations and the wis-
dom of its policy on a continuing basis."' "
This, of course, does not mean that an agency's change in position is
without significance in all circumstances. Such a change took on consider-
able importance in at least one recent case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm.10 State Farm, although not involving an agency
interpretation of a statute, is an important counterpoint to Chevron in
modern administrative law. There, the Supreme Court rejected the pro-
position that a deregulatory action-rescinding the requirement that the
U.S. automobile fleet install passive restraints during a phase-in
101. See, e.g., Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315 (1979); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-45 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969);
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
102. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. at 140; Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 231-37; Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. at 425 n.9. Additional cases emphasizing that long-standing interpretations have
great weight include United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 562 (1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 718-
19 (1975).
103. 104 S. Ct. at 2792. Earlier cases had given considerable weight to the consistency of agency
interpretations over time. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25
(1975) (recent SEC interpretation that was inconsistent with prior, long-standing interpretation not
entitled to deference); United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383, 396 (1956) (recent Treasury
interpretation that was. inconsistent with prior, long-standing interpretation not entitled to deference).
104. 104 S. Ct. at 2792. This conclusion comports with the established principle of administrative
law that an agency's modification of a proposed rule in light of comments received indicates reasoned
decisionmaking. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
105. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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period-should be scrutinized under the highly deferential standard appli-
cable when an agency simply declines to take any action. The courts have
traditionally been most deferential in declining to overturn an agency's
decision not to act at all; indeed, a recent Supreme Court decision,
Heckler v. Chaney,'06 held that such decisions are entitled to a presump-
tion of nonreviewability that may be rebutted only "where the substantive
statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its
enforcement powers."'10 7 But State Farm held that an agency decision to
rescind a rule should not be treated as a decision not to act in the first
instance. Thus, if an agency changes its view about the wisdom of a rule,
State Farm requires the agency to demonstrate not only that the new rule
is reasonable, but also that the agency's decision to change course is
reasonable.
Under Chevron, however, an agency that changes its mind about the
meaning of a statute it administers need not justify its change of course. It
must merely show that its new interpretation falls within the range of
reasonable interpretations. In this respect, as well as in the other three
respects discussed above, Chevron makes it much more difficult for a
reviewing court to overturn an agency interpretation.
Despite its strengthening of the deference principle, however, Chevron
has not made judicial review a dead letter. On the contrary, as the Court's
own post-Chevron decisions demonstrate, application of the Chevron
framework-particularly its first step-continues to be a potent check on
agency interpretations. 0 8 Indeed, step one of the Chevron analysis will be
the primary battleground on which litigation over agency interpretations
is fought. As we have seen, the Court itself did not find it necessary to go
beyond step one in Dimension Financial09 and four members of the
Court would have decided Chemical Manufacturers on the basis of
congressional intent alone." 0 So too, I recently participated in a decision
overturning an agency's interpretation of a statute on that ground."' I
suspect that such decisions will continue to be a prominent feature of the
106. 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
107. Id. at 1656. One case in which this presumption was successfully rebutted is Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), which is discussed in Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1657. In
Dunlop, the statute giving enforcement authority to the National Labor Relations Board required the
Board to take enforcement action if certain "clearly defined" factors were present. The Heckler opin-
ion distinguished Dunlop on the ground that these factors had provided sufficiently definite standards
to warrant reviewability in that case. Id at 1658.
108. Contrast this to other judicial tests' that seem to be satisfied almost invariably. For example,
the first prong of the familiar two-prong test of ripeness originally enunciated in Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), which concerns the fitness of the issue for judicial resolution, seems
to be satisfied much more frequently than not.
109. See supra text accompanying note 65.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
111. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 778 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Vol. 3: 283, 1986
Judicial Review
administrative law landscape. I therefore cannot agree with the jeremiads
that Chevron has somehow emasculated judicial review.
B. Unresolved Issues
Chevron also raised questions regarding the application of the deference
principle. These unresolved issues include whether the "sliding scale"
approach to deference retains any validity; whether courts will be more
willing to hold an interpretation "reasonable" when the statute relates to
the core powers of the Executive; and what a reviewing court should do
when faced with conflicting interpretations of the same statute by different
agencies.
First, it is not clear to what extent the "sliding scale" approach is still
appropriate, or to what extent any of the factors usually employed in that
analysis are still relevant. The Chevron approach seems rather absolute,
leaving little if any room for varying degrees of deference based on vary-
ing combinations of the factors discussed above. The three post-Chevron
cases have offered nothing that would call Chevron's seeming absolutism
into question. Yet, it is unclear whether the Court would be as willing to
defer if the statutory scheme were neither technical nor complex, and if
the agency making the interpretation had no particular expertise in the
area. If the statute in question were straightforward, free from the com-
plexity of, say, the environmental laws or the Internal Revenue Code,
then the Court might find no explicit or implicit gap left by Congress for
the agency-rather than the courts-to fill. Even if the Court found such
a gap, a lack of complexity might lead the Court to undertake a more
searching review of the reasonableness of the agency interpretation.
Second, it is not yet clear to what extent other prudential considerations
will affect the degree of deference afforded by reviewing courts to statu-
tory interpretations made by members of the executive branch. For exam-
ple, should a court be more willing to defer to a decision involving the use
of executive authority over the military or over foreign relations?.. 2 Such
considerations may well play an important role during step two of the
Chevron analysis, when a court is attempting to determine whether the
administrative interpretation at issue is sufficiently reasonable to be
upheld. Perhaps the Court will incline toward greater deference in mat-
ters that touch on core powers of the Executive than it would in less sensi-
tive settings.
112. My colleague Judge Bork, for example, has argued that the "principle of deference applies
with special force where the subject of that analysis is a delegation to the Executive of authority to
make and implement decisions relating to the conduct of foreign affairs." Abourezk v. Reagan, No.
84-5673, Slip Op. at 4 (D.C. Cir. March 11, 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting).
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Another unresolved problem is what a reviewing court should do when
agencies have adopted conflicting interpretations of the same statute. Such
situations are not frequent, but they do arise on occasion. The Federal
Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency, for example, have -
been known to take opposing views of the meaning of the Glass-Steagall
Act of 1933,118 a banking statute both agencies are charged with adminis-
tering.1 14 Chevron's recognition that there might be more than one rea-
sonable interpretation of a statute' " suggests that if both agencies' inter-
pretations were reasonable, both would be upheld if Congress had not
spoken to the issue. However, the Court could well require-based on a
desire to preserve consistency in the law or ensure fairness to regulated
entities-that only one of the two interpretations be permitted to stand.
III. Chevron's Broader Message
When one takes all of its legal effects into account, I believe Chevron
contains a broader message to the federal courts about their relationship to
administrative agencies. This message is best understood by considering
two paradigms upon which .that relationship might be based. These para-
digms represent the two ends of a continuum. At one end is the "supervi-
sory" paradigm, of which the relationship between the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts is the best example. At the other end is the
much more deferential "checking and balancing" paradigm, which
describes the relationship between the federal courts and Congress or
between the federal courts and the President. Prior to Chevron and the
1978 administrative law landmark, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC,11 the lower federal courts often saw the court-agency
relationship as a supervisory one in many respects. Chevron, taken to-
gether with Vermont Yankee, has made this view untenable. Although the
Court has not completely embraced the pure checking and balancing para-
digm as a normative description of the court-agency relationship, and
probably never will, Chevron strongly suggests that courts should see
113. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
114. In Investment Company Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), for example, the Comptroller
had interpreted sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act inconsistently with regulations previously
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board. See id. at 621-23. Other examples are cited in Coffman,
supra note 4, at 8 n.51.
115. The Court stated: "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only
one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would
have reached if the questions initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." 104 S. Ct. at 2782 n. 11.
116. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (administrative agencies are free to fashion their own procedural rules
and the courts may not impose procedural requirements that go beyond the minimum standards of the
Administrative Procedure Act).
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themselves not as supervisors of agencies, but more as a check or bulwark
against abuses of agency power.
A. The Paradigms Compared
The relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower courts dif-
fers from that between the Court and the other two branches in at least
five respects. First, the Supreme Court prescribes detailed rules to be fol-
lowed by the lower courts, but prescribes no such rules for Congress or
the President. Second, the Court conducts de novo review of lower courts'
legal analysis, but generally does not review those of Congress or the
President. Third, the Court seeks to ensure consistency in the decisions of
lower courts, but does not require consistency in presidential or congres-
sional decisionmaking. Fourth, the Court exercises much broader review
over the policy judgments of federal judges than over those of the Presi-
dent or Congress. Finally, the Court has at its disposal a broader range of
remedies when it reviews decisions of lower federal courts. In all of these
respects, the Court, in its checking and balancing relationship with the
coordinate branches, is much more deferential than in its role as supervi-
sor of the lower courts.
1. Rules
The first point of comparison between the two paradigms concerns the
Court's authority to prescribe the "rules of the game." At the behest of
Congress, the Supreme Court promulgates at least four sets of rules that
bind the lower federal courts. These rules are designed to promote justice
and ensure rational decisionmaking. They include the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. These
rules are, of course, drafted by advisory committees before the Court
approves them, and are subject to congressional approval. Even so, their
promulgation and enforcement are primarily the responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
11 7
By contrast, the Court makes no effort to impose procedures on either
of the coordinate branches. Thus, at the most obvious level, the Court does
not prescribe procedures by which the Congress must generate legislation,
or by which the White House must exercise executive power. All that the
Court does is ensure that the procedures employed by the legislative and
executive branches pass constitutional muster.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982); see also S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF Evi-
DENCE MANUAL 2-4 (1986).
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2. Review of Legal Analysis
The second point of comparison concerns the scope of review of legal
analysis. As already noted, the Supreme Court engages in de novo review
of such analysis by the lower federal courts, including their interpretations
of the Constitution, statutes, and prior cases, as well as their applications
of legal principles to specific factual situations.
Judicial review of legal analysis by Congress or the President has a
considerably more narrow scope. Since neither Congress nor the President
provides explicit analysis of legal problems, the Supreme Court rarely has
occasion to review a legal decision by a coordinate branch. Nonetheless,
many important decisions of both branches rest upon presidential or con-
gressional views of what is constitutional or lawful. The Court tries to
avoid intruding upon such implicit legal analysis. For instance, the Court
has enunciated a doctrine under which decisions that lie at the core of
Presidential power (e.g. decisions relating to the military or to foreign
policy) are unreviewable."1 8 More generally, under the "political ques-
tion" doctrine, the Court will sometimes avoid reviewing a decision it
deems constitutionally committed to the discretion of another branch of
government."" Finally, it is a well-settled principle that the Court, when
faced with a constitutional challenge to an Act of Congress, will attempt
to construe the statute at issue in a way that preserves its
constitutionality." All of these techniques reflect the Court's hesitancy to
overturn legal decisions made by coordinate branches.""
3. Ensuring Consistency
The third distinction between the two paradigms concerns the role of
the courts in ensuring consistent decisionmaking. In its relationship with
the lower courts, the Supreme Court is the guarantor of consistency in the
118. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 8 (1973);
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1948) (presi-
dential control over decisions by Civil Aeronautics Board regarding overseas and foreign air transpor-
tation not subject to review); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(President has "exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations").
119. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department ... ").
120. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("'When the
validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' ") (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (footnote omitted).
121. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962) (discussing various techniques used by the Court to avoid deciding
constitutional issues assigned to coordinate branches).
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law. The Court seeks to ensure that the lower federal courts follow prior
Supreme Court decisions."' 2 It also frequently agrees to hear cases solely
to resolve a conflict among the circuits." 8
In contrast to the Court's efforts to preserve doctrinal consistency
among the lower federal courts, the Court makes no attempt to ensure
that presidential policies or congressional decisionmaking are internally
consistent. As long as these decisions are not so irrational or inconsistent
as to be discriminatory and thereby run afoul of the Constitution, for
example, the Court will not interfere.
4. Policy Judgments
Another important distinction between the checking and balancing par-
adigm and the supervisory paradigm lies in the scope of review of policy
determinations. In general, policy considerations play only a limited role
in judicial decisions, appearing most often in such largely judge-made ar-
eas of the law as torts, contracts, antitrust, and equitable remedies, where
the courts expressly take into account "the public interest." To the extent
that a court's view of wise policy plays a role in its decision, a reviewing
court may overturn that policy determination just as easily as it can over-
turn the analysis of a purely legal issue. Superior courts therefore need
not defer to or even accord respect to the policy choices of lower courts.
This, of course, stands in sharp contrast to the Court's treatment of
policy determinations made by the executive and legislative branches. As
long as policy decisions by the President and Congress pass constitutional
muster, the Court does not subject them to further scrutiny. It does not
second guess legislative or executive policy choices.
5. Remedies
The final point of comparison involves the range of remedies available
to the Court if it believes an error has been committed. If the Supreme
Court determines that a lower court has erred, the Court has several
options. It can simply solve the problem without sending the case back
down; it can send the case back down with precise instructions; or it can
122. See, e.g., McAllister v. New Jersey, 396 F.2d 776, 777 (3d Cir. 1968); Bursten v. United
States, 395 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1968), on appeal of remand, 453 F.2d 605 (1971) (affirming
unreported trial decision), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); Davis v. Board of School Commission-
ers, 318 F.2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1963); Lichter Found., Inc., v. Welch 269 F.2d 142, 145 (6th Cir.
1959).
123. Recent examples include Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des
Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 700 (1982); Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 433 (1982); Howe v.
Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 (1981).
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reverse the lower court's judgment, explain why it is doing so, and leave it
to the lower court to choose the appropriate disposition. In brief, the
Court has tremendous flexibility and authority not only to dictate a new
remedy but also to determine the appropriate forum for providing that
remedy.
The Court does not, however, make any effort to rectify mistakes made
by either the President or Congress. If, for example, the Court determines
that a statute is unavoidably unconstitutional, it does not attempt to
amend the statute, except to the extent that a narrow reading of the stat-
ute may be considered an amendment. It simply invalidates the statute
and thus returns the matter to Congress. 124 When reviewing congressional
statutes or executive actions, the Court does not have the broad range of
remedies that it has when reviewing decisions of lower courts.
In short, the Supreme Court has broad authority to supervise lower
federal courts. Except for findings of fact, 125 the Court does not, as a gen-
eral matter, have any obligation to defer to determinations made by dis-
trict and circuit courts. By contrast, the relationships between the Court
and the coordinate branches of the federal government-Congress and the
President-are characterized by a high degree of deference. The Court
does not see itself as a supervisor of its coordinate branches. Rather, it
provides a check and a balance, ensuring that legislative and executive
actions remain within certain bounds. Otherwise, it leaves the other
branches free to pursue the policies they select in the manner they deem to
be in the public interest.
1 26
B. Agency-Court Relations Before Chevron and Vermont Yankee
Prior to Chevron and Vermont Yankee, the agency-court relationship,
at least as perceived by the lower federal courts, fit into the supervisory
paradigm in at least three ways. First, as reflected in the Court of Appeals
decision in Vermont Yankee, some federal courts believed they could pre-
scribe procedural rules for executive agencies.1 " Second, as discussed ear-
lier, courts often felt free to undertake a de novo interpretation of a stat-
124. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
unconstitutional the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) (holding unconstitutional a federal law against "yellow dog" contracts on interstate railroads).
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (finding of fact may be set aside if clearly erroneous); Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511-12 (1985) (discussing clearly erroneous rule).
126. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 784 (1948) (delegation of authority by Congress in
Renegotiation Act was within the "scope of its discretion"); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454
(1939) (fixing a reasonable time for ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment "lies within
the congressional province" of Article V powers and therefore "would not be subject to review by the
courts").
127. See I K. DAvis, supra note 81, at § 2:18.
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ute, even when the administering agency had already provided its own
interpretation.'28 Third, courts fostered consistency in agency decision-
making by professing to give greater deference to long-standing agency
interpretations 12  and requiring agencies to explain and justify any change
in position.1 80
Judicial review of agencies' policy choices, however, fell somewhere
between the deference accorded by courts to decisions by Congress or the
President and the complete absence of deference accorded in this respect
by superior federal courts to lower courts. 1 ' In this regard, the relation-
ship was not wholly supervisory because a reviewing court could not, for
example, overturn an agency's policy choice merely because the court be-
lieved the decision to be misguided or wrong. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, a policy decision made by an agency could be overturned
only if "arbitrary and capricious."12 When determining whether an
agency choice was arbitrary or capricious, however, courts were admon-
ished to take a "hard look" at the agency choice' and to engage in a
"searching and careful" review of the agency's reasoning.1 Hence, courts
did not have to accord agencies the same degree of deference accorded to
Congress and the President.
The only feature of the court-agency relationship that fit-and still
fits-the checking and balancing paradigm prior to Chevron and Vermont
Yankee is the narrow range of remedies available to a reviewing court
when it believes an agency has gone astray. Under well-established
administrative law principles, a court cannot affirm an agency decision on
a ground other than that articulated by the agency.'3 5 Hence, a reviewing
court cannot simply remedy a defective decision. Rather, it must remand
the case to the agency and allow the agency to cure the defects.
Thus, although the relationship between courts and agencies obviously
did not fit perfectly the supervisory paradigm prior to Chevron and
Vermont Yankee, it tended to fit that paradigm in many respects. Before
these decisions, then, lower federal courts could easily view their appro-
128. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (1976); see also 5 K.
DAVIS, supra note 81, at § 28:6.
129. See 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 81, at § 28:3; see also St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936).
130. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 718-19 (1975); Skidmore
v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
131. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
132. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
133. See Greater Boston Television Co. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971). For a discussion of the "hard-look" doctrine, see Sunstein, Deregulation and the
Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177.
134. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
135. See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 356 (1985).
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priate role as one of supervision rather than one of providing checks and
balances.
C. The Chevron and Vermont Yankee Revolution
Chevron and Vermont Yankee, however, produced a decided shift away
from the supervisory paradigm and toward the checking and balancing
paradigm. They did so by severely restricting the authority of federal
courts to prescribe rules for agencies, to review agency legal analyses, to
ensure consistency in agency interpretations, and, to some extent, to over-
turn agency policy choices. As already noted, however, these decisions had
no effect on the range of remedies available to a court that believes an
agency has gone astray; in this respect, the agency-court relationship con-
tinues to fit the checking and balancing paradigm.
Vermont Yankee substantially eroded the supervisory paradigm as a
normative description of the court-agency relationship by refusing to per-
mit the Court of Appeals to prescribe procedural rules beyond those con-
tained in the Administrative Procedure Act. The case involved a rulemak-
ing by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to decide how
environmental effects associated with the uranium fuel cycle would be
considered in the AEC's licensing of nuclear plants. The Court of Appeals
concluded that even though the AEC had satisfied all the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act, the agency's procedures for considering
fuel reprocessing and disposal issues were inadequate."' The Supreme
Court reversed. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist
stated that "agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of proce-
dure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to dis-
charge their multitudinous duties. 1 38 7 According to the Court, then,
federal courts were not free to establish procedural rules for agencies in
the same way that the Supreme Court promulgates procedural and other
rules for the lower federal courts.
Chevron completed the task begun in Vermont Yankee by definitively
dislodging the supervisory paradigm as an appropriate model on which to
base the agency-court relationship. It did so in three ways. First, as dis-
cussed earlier, Chevron established that unless congressional intent is
clear, courts are not free to engage in a de novo interpretation of a statute
that has already been interpreted by the agency charged with its adminis-
tration. Second, as already noted, Chevron explicitly allowed for the possi-
bility of multiple reasonable interpretations of a statute and minimized the
136. 547 F.2d at 658-59 (Bazelon J., concurring).
137. 435 U.S. at 543.
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importance of the longevity of an agency interpretation; in so doing, it
undermined the ability of federal courts to ensure consistency in agency
interpretation. Finally, Chevron moved review of agencies' policy choices
somewhat closer to the checking and balancing paradigm by reminding
lower courts of their general obligation not to intrude into the agencies'
policy-making domain. After Chevron and Vermont Yankee, therefore,
none of the features of the supervisory paradigm applies to the agency-
court relationship.
That is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court has now adopted
the checking and balancing paradigm completely. As the Supreme Court's
State Farm decision recently reminded us, a court must still undertake a
"searching and careful" review of any agency decision to ensure that the
outcome is not irrational, that the agency's explanaton of the outcome is
adequate, and that the agency's own procedures have been followed.188
Under Chevron, moreover, a court may still overturn an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute found to be unreasonable or contrary to clear con-
gressional intent.
Vermont Yankee and Chevron have nonetheless produced a revolution
in administrative law. They have.not only changed and refined particular
doctrines, but, more importantly, they have changed-and will continue to
change-the way courts conceive of their relationship to administrative
agencies. Although the Supreme Court's view of the relationship between
courts and agencies has not moved completely to the checking and balanc-
ing paradigm-and I doubt that it ever will-Chevron makes it clear, at
the very least, that the supervisory paradigm is no longer appropriate.
IV. Why Chevron Makes Sense
Was Chevron a "good" decision? I think it was, both because I find its
jurisprudential foundations appealing and because I think it will have a
number of salutary practical effects.
A. Jurisprudence
Chevron appeals to me largely because I think it inappropriate for fed-
eral courts to take a supervisory approach when reviewing agency deci-
sions. That is not to say, however, that courts should always be as defer-
ential to agencies as to Congress or the President. Except where Congress
has seen fit to commit certain matters to agency discretion or otherwise to
insulate certain matters from judicial review, the courts have a
congressionally-mandated duty, by virtue of the Administrative Procedure
138. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
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Act and various organic statutes, to act as a check on the administrative
agencies. Also, allowing agencies unbridled discretion would run afoul of
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court's non-delegation doc-
trine, which in broad terms holds that Congress may not delegate power
to an agency without providing adequate standards for the exercise of that
power.189 For these reasons, judicial review of agency action should not be
toothless. Courts are not, the Supreme Court frequently reminds us, sim-
ply to "rubberstamp" agency decisions' 4" or to transform deference into
"judicial inertia.
14 1
However, administrative agencies are not subordinate to the federal
courts in the organizational structure established by the Constitution. This
alone suggests that Article III judges lack general supervisory authority
over the agencies. Neither the framers of the Constitution nor subsequent
legislative assemblies, moreover, have seen fit to confer that supervisory
power on the courts. For the courts to assume such authority on their own
would be inconsistent with the status of the judiciary as the only unelected
branch. In part because federal judges are not directly accountable to any
electorate, I believe they have a duty voluntarily to exercise "judicial
restraint," that is, to avoid intrusions not clearly mandated by Congress or
the Constitution into the processes and decisions of any other branch.
Thus, Chevron reflects a more self-effacing-and in my view more appro-
priate-judicial philosophy than that embodied in earlier decisions laying
claim to broader reviewing authority. 42
Chevron accomplished this shift in thinking without violating the prin-
ciples of judicial review enunciated in Marbury. As already explained,
judicial review of agency interpretations, and of agency actions in general,
is still significantly more potent than judicial review of decisions by the
President or Congress. In undertaking the first step of the Chevron analy-
sis,"4s moreover, a court retains authority to decide the critical issue
whether Congress has conferred interpretive authority upon the agency.
As Professor Monaghan has said: "The court's interpretational task ... is
to determine the boundaries of delegated authority.' 44 The judicial pre-
rogative to determine that an agency lacks interpretive authority or that its
139. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (delegation
must contain an "intelligible principle" to which the agency must conform); see also Note, Rethinking
the Non-Delegation Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. REv. 257 (1982).
140. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89,
97 (1983) (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965)).
141. NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees of America, Local 1182, No. 84-1493, slip op. at 9
(U.S. February 26, 1986) (quoting American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)).
142. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
143. 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984).
144. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 6.
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exercise of that authority has been arbitrary or capricious continues to
provide a significant check on administrative agencies.14
Thus, when fully appreciated, Chevron vindicates the appropriate and
traditional function of judicial review. It confirms the judiciary's historic
role of declaring what the law is, but prevents the judiciary from going
beyond that venerable, legitimate role and straying into the forbidden
ground of overseeing administrative agencies. When Congress has not spo-
ken to an issue, Chevron forbids the courts to engage in supervisory over-
sight of the agencies. Ours is not to supervise; that role is allotted to the
political branches, those directly accountable to the people. Chevron af-
firms that fundamental allocation of responsibility.
B. Practical Consequences
In addition to its jurisprudential implications, the Chevron approach
should produce important practical benefits. In particular, it should allow
agencies to use their expertise in interpreting the many complex statutes
that characterize the modern administrative state; improve agency pro-
ceedings; encourage better legislative draftsmanship by Congress; and per-
mit an incoming administration to carry out its electoral mandate more
comprehensively and consistently.
1. Relying on Agency Expertise
Agencies have certain well-recognized advantages in interpreting their
own statutes. An agency obviously enjoys a more thorough understanding
than the generalist judiciary of how a statute's various provisions
interrelate and how different interpretations of a particular provision af-
fect relevant parties.146 Particularly where an agency has drafted a statute
and shepherded it through Congress, the agency's understanding of the
statute's language, its legislative history, and its goals is likely to be quite
thorough and complete. Technical expertise, moreover, may greatly aid
the interpretation of regulatory statutes, especially where an understand-
ing of congressional intent requires familiarity with technical issues, as we
saw in the Riverside Bayview case. 47 Although technical statutes are, of
course, produced by generalist legislators-implying that congressional in-
tent presumably would be as accessible to judges as it is to a technically
145. Illuminating discussions of these issues have been provided by Jaffe, supra note 4, at 258-59,
and Monaghan, supra note 3, at 27-34.
146. See McGowan, Congress, Courts and Control of Delegated Authority, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1164-68 (1977); Monaghan, supra note 3, at 31; Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 31 AD. L. REV. 329, 339-41 (1979).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
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competent agency 148-the agency inevitably enjoys an edge in understand-
ing technical concepts and terminology contained in the statute or its legis-
lative history. The agency is also more familiar with the regulated indus-
try. These advantages of agency expertise are all the more evident during
an era of burgeoning judicial caseloads, when judges must move rapidly
from one area of the law to another.
Agency expertise is especially valuable when a regulatory scheme is
complex or statutory terms are broad and imprecise. Many regulatory
statutes, particularly those enacted in the 1960's and since, are highly
complex.' 9 Chevron and Chemical Manufacturers both placed special
emphasis on the sheer complexity of the statute at issue. 5 0 Many statutes,
moreover, contain terms that are intentionally imprecise. Examples of this
studied imprecision are the term "public interest," which figures promi-
nently in such measures as the Communications Act of 193415 adminis-
tered by the Federal Communications Commission, and the phrase
"closely related to banking," which figures prominently in the Bank
Holding Company Act""' administered by the Federal Reserve Board.
Agency administrators, who have extensive experience with both the regu-
latory scheme and the regulated industry, are much better placed than
generalist judges to make the policy decisions that such broad terms seem
to invite. In my view, Chevron quite properly recognized that such terms
constitute an implicit, but nonetheless valid, delegation of authority to the
agency.153
2. Improving Agency Proceedings
As a practicing lawyer in Washington, I frequently heard lawyers
deride administrative agencies. They were particularly fond of criticizing
148. See Stever, supra note 4, at 59-61.
149. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376; Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982)); Staggers Railroad Act of 1980, Pub. L. no. 96-448, 94
Stat. 1895 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10103 (1982)) (deregulating trucking); Railroad Revitali-
zation and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 45 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.) (deregulating railroad transportation);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767; Pub.L. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3300 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662,
4681-4682 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982)) (so-called "Superfund" statute, providing for clean-
up of hazardous waste dump sites); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982)) (regulating the generation, trans-
portation, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes).
150. 104 S. Ct. at 2785, 2792-93; 105 S. Ct. at 1108.
151. Communications Act of 1934, June 19, 1934, ch. 652, Title I-VI, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)).
152. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
153. 104 S. Ct. at 2782, 2793.
Vol. 3: 283, 1986
Judicial Review
the legal analysis in agency decisions. On the other hand, I often heard
administrators complain that many of their actions-including statutory
interpretations-were superfluous, since reviewing courts, in their view,
often felt free to overturn them at will.
Both the spirit and the letter of Chevron should help change these per-
ceptions, thereby improving the quality of agency proceedings. By giving
them more interpretive authority, Chevron will encourage agencies to take
more responsibility for interpreting the statutes they implement. 1" For
the same reason, the quality of argument by parties before the agencies
should improve. Because a court reviewing an agency determination is
now less free to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, litigants
will have an increased incentive to make their best arguments, clearly and
aggressively, before the agency rather than waiting for the main event at
the courthouse.
3. Improving Statutory Draftsmanship
Chevron also places the burden on Congress to legislate with greater
precision if it wants to temper the agencies' new power. Consider the leg-
islative-executive relationship before the Supreme Court decided Chevron
and INS v. Chadha,"' which declared the one-house legislative veto un-
constitutional' 56 and appears to have struck down the two-house legisla-
tive veto as well. Prior to these decisions, if Congress objected to the inter-
pretation of a statute embodied in an agency's rule or regulation, it could
veto the rule or regulation with a simple (one-house) or joint resolution
provided that the original statute contained a legislative veto provision. If
Congress approved of the interpretation, however, it could generally
assume that the agency would continue to adhere to it. Neither option is
open to Congress any longer. Chadha put an end to the legislative veto,
and Chevron has unsettled the assumption that agencies will abide by
orthodox interpretations of the statutes they administer. The agencies are
now at greater liberty to alter their readings of ambiguous statutory
language.
Legislators are thus left with one principal means of limiting agency
discretion: they must draft clearer, more specific statutes. Clearer statutes
are obviously preferable to vague ones, and, although clarity requires
greater consensus among the lawmakers, making consensus more difficult
154. Professor Jaffe once said that "there is . . . a value in this recognition of administrative
autonomy; it may invigorate the sense of responsibility, stimulate initiative, and encourage resource-
fulness." Jaffe, supra note 4, at 261.
155. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
156. See id. at 958-59.
Yale Journal on Regulation
to achieve is by no means bad in itself. If Congress must express itself
more clearly in the interest of keeping agencies on a tighter rein, it may
pass fewer laws. Those it does pass, however, will be better than many on
the books now.
4. Increasing Presidential Prerogative
Chevron will also make it easier for a new administration to carry out
its electoral mandate. After Chevron, agencies may depart more easily
from their predecessors' interpretations. By orchestrating a number of
changes in statutory interpretations by different agencies, an incoming ad-
ministration will be better able to recast the regulatory system in its own
image.
Increasing the power of the Executive in this way entails the obvious
risk that the changes made may prove unwise. Despite this risk, however,
I believe this to be a change for the better. Unelected judges should leave
the executive branch free to pursue, within appropriate bounds, what it
perceives to be the will of the people. If Congress disagrees with the Exec-
utive's new statutory interpretations, the proper response lies, again, in
drafting clearer laws and amending vague ones.
Conclusion
Chevron, then, is one of the most important administrative law deci-
sions in recent memory. The decision makes it clear that federal courts, in
reviewing a statutory interpretation by an administrative agency, are not
simply to substitute their own judgment for that of the agency; rather,
they are to accept the agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable
and Congress has expressed no clearly discernible intent to the contrary.
More broadly, Chevron conveyed the clear message to the lower federal
courts that theirs is not to supervise the administrative agencies.
Chevron shifts power from the courts to the agencies, shifting with it
the site of the real battle over regulatory decisions. In numerous ways, the
decision returns the power to set policy to democratically accountable offi-
cials, not least by making it easier for a new administration to oust an old
regulatory order. It encourages Congress to speak with clarity,
heightening its responsibility for the choices it makes. Above all, Chevron
chastens the excessive intrusion of courts into the business of agency pol-
icy-making. Policy, which is not the natural province of courts, belongs
properly to the administrative agencies, and, ultimately, to the executive
and legislature that oversee them.
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